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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 01/08/2006 Accident number: 429 
Accident time: Not recorded Accident Date: 08/07/2003 
Where it occurred: Mowbr Al-Basara Army 
Supply Base, Basra 
Country: Iraq 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Demolition accident Date of main report: 29/07/2003 
ID original source: [Name removed] Name of source: [Name removed] 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Propellant Ground condition: not applicable 
Date record created: 01/08/2006 Date  last modified: 01/08/2006 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east: Long 47, 43', 35" Map north: North Lat 30,26', 22" 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
Accident report 
A preliminary report was made available in 2005 and is reproduced below, edited for 
anonymity. 
 
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REPORT 1 
Incident:  
On the morning 8rd July 2003. [Name excised 1] a Team Leader and Supervisor for [the 
Demining group] was taking part in a clearance operation with [Name excised 2] and 
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members of [the Demining group] EOD/Demining team at Mowbr Al-Basara Army Supply 
Base North Lat 30,26’, 22” and East Long 47, 43’, 35”.  
The UN Mine Action Service assigned the task to [the Demining group] by the UN Mine Action 
Service.  [The Demining group] has been on the site now since 1 Jul. And were in the final 
phases of the clearance task. [The Victim] was in the process of clearing the last of the 
propellant that was on site. Once collected he had a small pile less than a meter in diameter. 
He then prepared a propellant trail leading into the main body of the propellant. 
[The Victim] used a combination of projectile propellant and black powder from a charge bag 
in his fuze trail. Once the area was clear of all other personnel he attempted to light this trail. 
It was at this point that the black powder ignited and flashed causing burns to [his] lower inner 
right arm and upper side of face.  
The medic on site saw [the Victim]. Dr [name excised 2] suggested [the Victim] be transported 
to the British Medical Hospital. Which he was. At the BMH [the Victim] was treated for the 
burns mentioned above and released, with instructions to return in two days time for a 
dressing change [Demining group] personnel then returned [the Victim] to Basra. 
 
Salient Facts: 
The following are salient facts involved with this incident: 
The mixing of Black Powder in the ignition trail. 
The experience of the operator. 
 
Conclusions & Recommendations: 
The following are conclusion and recommendations: 
Conclusion: 
It was the mixing of the Black Powder from the charge bag in with the projectile propellant that 
caused the flash, which burned the operator. 
The operator’s lack of experience about the different types of propellants and their effects    
Recommendations:  
That the use of Black Powder be avoided in the ignition trails of propellant burns. 
Only qualified experienced EOD operators carry out propellant burn tasks. Or non qualified 
EOD personnel carry out these tasks under careful supervision. 
Proper ignition sets be used. Consisting of Time Fuze and flares or Railway fuze’s. Allowing 
for a timed burn. 
 
Summary: 
This accident was preventable. The wrong choice was made in using the Black Powder in the 
ignition trail. But this was done through a lack of experience rather then a blatant disregard for 
the rules for propellant burning. In the future propellant should only be burnt using proper 
ignition trains involving Time Fuze and flares or Railway fuze’s which allow for a controlled 
timed burn with plenty of time to exit the area to a safe location.  
Signed: Demining group Location Manager, Basra, Iraq. 
 
An email among the files made available recorded that: UNMAS would not investigate and 




Overview of Preliminary Investigation Report Concerning [the Victim] 
Introduction 
This overview has been requested by [the] Operations Manager (and currently Programme 
Manager) of [Demining group] in Iraq. 
The preliminary investigation report deals specifically with an incident in which [the Victim] 
was injured, whilst in the process of disposing of bulk propellant as part of a clearance task 
being undertaken in Basra. 
The overview seeks to identify areas of concern contained within the Preliminary Investigation 
Report, identify safety issues, and to make conclusions, and recommendations to the 
Operations manager for his further action. 
Area of Concern 1 
That the propellant is described as being “piled”  into a configuration of less than 1 metre in 
diameter. The definition of the diameter configuration does not make clear whether a 
complete area of ground 1 metre in diameter was covered by the propellant to be burned, or 
whether propellant had been prepared for disposal by burning in the configuration (crows foot)  
as shown in [Demining group] SOPs for Iraq, and that this configuration accounted for the 1 
metre diameter. 
If propellant HAS been piled as described, then it is more likely, given the decrease in 
insensitivity referred to in a previous overview, that the weight of the propellant on the lower 
layers is more likely to cause “flash through”.  
Recommendation 
That ALL EOD Operators familiarise themselves with “profile depth” requirements and 
constraints, when disposing of bulk propellant by burning, and ADHERE to them. 
 
Area of Concern 2 
That an initiation trail be led INTO propellant to be burned, and not AWAY from the propellant. 
Lying an initiation trail from the firing point TO the propellant necessitates walking back along 
the trail, once laid, and the scope for missed step, and subsequent compression and ignition 
of the initiation trail is greatly increased. 
Recommendation 
That EOD Operators immediately CEASE the laying of initiation trails FROM the firing point, 
and back to the propellant to be disposed of. 
  
Area of Concern 3 
That a mixture of black powder and propellant was used as the constituents for the initiation 
trail. This is an INHERENTLY DANGEROUS practice, the likely results of which have formed 
the basis for the report in the first place. Mixtures of propellants and powder grains should 
never have been allowed. 
Recommendation 
That all EOD operators immediately cease the practice of mixing propellant types in order to 
form initiation trails. 
 
Area of Concern 4 
That the level of experience of the operator has been quoted as a significant factor in this 
incident. It might well be true that [the Victim] does not have the depth of experience in an 
EOD field (as opposed to mine clearance), if this has been identified as a probable cause by 
the location manager, then the location manager should have taken all necessary steps to 
ensure that:  
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 [The victim] was not to have conducted disposal, or; 
That [the Victim] was to be supervised whilst conducting the disposal. 
Recommendation: 
That where senior location personnel are aware of possible “experience gaps” in operator 
skills and knowledge, that the operator works under supervision of an experienced and 
QUALIFIED operator until such time as sufficient knowledge of procedures and associated 
hazards has been assimilated by the individual. 
That [Demining group] identify the “skills pool” available in country, and where necessary,, 
adjust personnel to location to ensure an “even spread” of experience and knowledge. 




Victim number: 572 Name: [Name removed] 
Age: 32 Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: None 
 









Patient was exposed to flames of propellant burn causing 1st and 2nd degree burns involving 
Rt upper limb and the Rt side of the face and Rt ear, also the upper lip and eyebrows, 
nostrils” 
“Burned by propellants – right arm and right side of face. Nasal hairs singed. Scores 61/2 out 
of 10 for pain on a scale of 1-10. Pain is increasing over time. 
BP: 159/94”. Other notes are in English but illegible. 
In an exchange between the Victim’s superiors it was noted that “All that was hurt was his 
pride. He will be on light duties ‘till Thur.”  In the same exchange (08.07.2003 12:34) “The 
powder flashed and he received a burn to his lower right arm and right side of face. But they 
are not serious. Not even close to [the victim of Incident 426]'s. He was taken to BMH 






The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because the internal 
investigation identified the Victim’s lack of experience as a cause. The fact that he was 
repeating an accident that he had attended at the same place only six days earlier indicates 
that he lacked enough experience to learn from the earlier event. [See accident 426.] The 
secondary cause is listed as a “Management Control Inadequacy” because the demining 
group allowed the Victim to be given tasks for which he was not suitably qualified and/or 
experienced. 
The internal investigation was thorough and blunt in its analysis, demonstrating the demining 
group’s professionalism. It is regretted that the national MAC did not make its own 
investigation.  
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